We provide empirical evidence that risk sharing enhances specialization in production. To the best of our knowledge, this well-established and important theoretical proposition has not been tested before. Our empirical procedure is summarized as follows. First, we construct a measure of specialization in production, and calculate an index of specialization for each of the European Community EC and non-EC OECD countries, U.S. states, Canadian provinces, Japanese prefectures, Latin American countries, and regions of Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Then, we estimate the degree of capital market integration a measure of risk sharing within each of these groups of regions: the EC countries, the non-EC OECD countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom and rely on another author's estimate for Latin America. Finally, w e perform a regression of the specialization index on the degree of risk sharing, controlling for relevant economic variables. We nd a positive and signi cant relation between the degree of specialization of individual members of a group of countries, provinces, states, or prefectures, and the amount of risk that is shared within the group. We perform regressions using variables such as shareholder rights and the size of the nancial sector relative to GDP as instruments for the amount o f i n ter-regional risk sharing. These regressions con rm that risk sharing|facilitated by a f a vorable legal environment and a developed nancial system|is a direct causal determinant of industrial specialization. JEL Classi cation: F15, F2, F36, F43
Introduction
That countries gain from specialization is one of the few widely accepted economic tenets. Gains from specialization may arise from technological di erences Ricardo, factor endowments Heckscher-Ohlin, or from increasing returns to scale. 1 These theories have traditionally been formulated in non-stochastic environments. In the presence of production risk and in the absence of markets for insuring this risk, countries that specialize in the production of a small number of goods may su er a loss in economic welfare due to the high variance of Gross Domestic Product GDP. These countries may therefore choose not to specialize, as noted by Brainard and Cooper 1968 , Kemp and Liviatan 1973 , and Ru n 1974 Insurance of production risk may take many forms, from explicit insurance against adverse outcomes typically natural disasters to forward markets where commodities are sold at a xed price for future delivery. The main mechanism for spreading risk among regions and countries is, however, diversi cation of ownership, achieved via capital markets. If interregional and international capital markets are well integrated, regions and countries, being insured against idiosyncratic shocks, can a ord to specialize more thereby exploiting comparative advantage further, whether such advantage is due to technology, factor endowments, or economies of scale. Indeed, from the analysis in Razin 1978a, 1978b it follows that country specialization will be higher when there is international trade in both securities and goods. 2 Helpman and Razin's analysis covers both the Ricardian case without insurance, countries may not fully specialize in the good they can produce at low unit cost, and the Heckscher-Ohlin case without insurance, countries will specialize less in the good that is intensive in the factor in which they are relatively abundant, but does not address the case of trade driven by increasing returns to scale. A simple example provided in the next section illustrates how their proposition applies to this case as well.
Insurance induced specialization has potentially non-trivial consequences for economic growth. Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990 , Saint-Paul 1992 , Obstfeld 1994a , Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997 , and Feeney 1997 have written theoretical models where capital market integration induces higher specialization which in turn stimulates output and growth. In Obstfeld 1994a the basic premise is that countries choose the investment mix in risky high 1 See, e.g., Krugman 1979 and Helpman 1981 , 1984 Further work on this topic include papers by Anderson 1981 , Grossman and Razin 1984 , 1985 , Helpman 1988 , and Feeney 1994 1 return projects and safe low return projects. International asset trade allows countries to hold a diversi ed portfolio encouraging them to shift investment t o wards high return projects. 3 In the model proposed by Saint-Paul 1992, the basic trade-o is between the gains from specialization due to comparative advantage in production and a lower variance of output, while Feeney 1997 develops the idea that in the presence of learning by doing in production, an increase in specialization entails higher growth during a transition period.
To the best of our knowledge, no evidence has been brought to bear on this issue. Hufbauer and Chilas 1974 and Krugman 1991 demonstrated that U.S. states are more specialized than OECD countries, and interpreted this observation as evidence that barriers to trade are greater across countries than across U.S. states, but neither performed a systematic empirical study of the determinants of regional specialization patterns|a task we undertake here.
Researchers see King and Levine 1993 , Levine and Zervos 1998 , and Rajan and Zingales 1998 for prominent examples have found a positive correlation between nancial depth" and the rate of economic growth. They have not, however, provided direct evidence regarding the mechanism through which nancial intermediation and capital market integration promote growth. One such mechanism is higher specialization in production facilitated by better spreading of production risk which, in turn, is more easily achieved where nancial markets are developed and reliable. Our empirical results provide strong support for this view.
The theoretical models described above point to the following empirical strategy: For various groups of regions or countries e.g., U.S. states, Japanese prefectures, European Community EC countries, calculate a measure of the degree of insurance among members of the group, and for each member compute an index of industrial specialization in production. Then, to test the common empirical prediction of the above theories, check whether a high degree of insurance risk sharing within a group of regions or countries is associated with high specialization in production of the group members, when other potential determinants of industrial specialization are controlled for. Next, nd variables which are exogenous to the degree of specialization but likely to be correlated with the extent of observed inter-regional risk sharing, and perform instrumental variables regression in order to determine the direction of causality.
Much of the variation in our sample is due to di erences in risk sharing and specialization across groups of regions that constitute countries U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and so forth, but the basic logic of our approach is best illustrated by the striking di erence in patterns of risk sharing and specialization in groups of regions within countries versus groups of countries.
It is, by n o w , a w ell established empirical regularity that there is little risk sharing between countries; see French and Poterba 1991 and Werner 1995 who document the home bias" puzzle, Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland 1992 who compare cross-country GDP correlations and consumption correlations, and S rensen and Yosha 1998 and Arreaza 1998 who carry out cross-country variance decompositions of shocks to GDP for EC OECD and Latin American countries respectively. All these studies point to negligible risk sharing through cross-country ownership of assets.
In contrast, as shown by Asdrubali, S rensen, and Yosha 1996, there is substantial risk sharing among states within the United States. Using the same methodology, Alberola and Asdrubali 1998 and Dedola, Usai, and Vannini 1998 found substantial risk sharing among regions within Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In this paper we further document considerable risk sharing among provinces within Canada and among prefectures within Japan. 4 If risk sharing is important for specialization one would expect U.S. states, regions of Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom, Canadian provinces, and Japanese prefectures to be more specialized than EC, OECD, or Latin American countries. Our empirical work con rms this hypothesis.
The nding survives when we perform a more detailed regression analysis with the approximately 170 regions and countries in our sample, controlling for characteristics such a s population density and per capita GDP, and using various measures of specialization and various sub-samples e.g., omitting U.S. states or Latin American countries from the sample.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the positive relation between risk sharing and specialization also survives when we perform the regressions only with regions within countries i.e., eliminating groups of countries from the sample. This con rms that the di erences in specialization patterns are not entirely driven by di erences in the amount and composition of, or barriers to, international versus intranational trade. It also suggests that the results are not driven by higher factor physical capital or labor mobility across regions within countries than across countries.
Exogeneity o f i n ter-regional risk sharing through cross-holding of productive assets|the central explanatory variable of specialization in our empirical speci cation|is an issue of importance. In all the theoretical models cited above, insurance among economic agents is regarded as exogenous. To justify this assumption, one may i n voke the exogeneity o f institutions that allow agents to insure. Decisions regarding the choice of product lines, entry to an industry, o r i n vestment in new technologies are taken by rm managers and shareholders and by e n trepreneurs who take insurance opportunities as given. Even if these institutions change over time, the change is slow and does not a ect the decision to specialize in production.
Although this view has merit, it is wise to allow for a di erent scenario, where the degree of inter-regional cross-holding of productive assets is a ected|at least to some extent|by the degree of specialization in production. One might imagine, for example, a federation with geographic or demographic characteristics that render high regional specialization particularly attractive. Institutions that facilitate risk sharing may then develop in response to the need for insurance raised by the specialized regional production structure. In order to obtain estimates that are robust to such reverse causality," we use instrumental variables estimation. Fortunately, instruments are available that are highly unlikely to be a ected by reverse causality. In particular, we use quantitative indicators of the strength of the part of the legal environment," for instance protection of investor rights, that is likely to have a n impact on the amount of cross-regional ownership. In the corporate nance literature it has been documented that the legal tradition|as it impacts on, shareholder rights for example| is a strong determinant of national stock market capitalization the premier institution for nationwide risk sharing. We use the legal environment indicators suggested by L a P orta et al. 1997, 1998 as instruments. We further use the share of the nancial sector in GDP|a direct indicator of nancial depth"|as an alternative instrument. Our results are not sensitive to what instruments we use and are similar to the OLS results, which indicates that, to a rst approximation, risk sharing is exogenous for specialization and causality runs from risk sharing to specialization.
Constructing measures of industrial specialization in production is standard. By contrast, measuring the amount of risk sharing achieved within a group of regions or countries is not. A central methodological issue in this context is whether we should construct a measure of the extent to which regions smooth their income for example, through cross-regional diversi cation of ownership or, whether we should use a measure of the smoothness of regional consumption. We discuss conceptual aspects of this choice at the end of the next section. For our main speci cation, we opt for an income-based measure of risk sharing, but in a separate section, we also study empirically the relation between industrial specialization and a consumption-based measure of risk sharing. In Section 2, we spell out a simple framework that highlights the e ect of risk sharing on specialization and addresses conceptual aspects concerning the measurement of risk sharing and specialization. In Section 3, we describe the specialization and risk sharing measures that we use in our analysis. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of a consumption-based measure of risk sharing, Section 6 concludes, and an appendix describes our data.
A Simple Conceptual Framework
The theoretical foundations for the e ect of risk sharing on industrial specialization are well established, so we do not see a need for a detailed model. It is, nevertheless, helpful to reformulate the theory in our own words to set the stage for the empirical analysis. Being novel, the empirical implementation of the theory poses conceptual di culties that are best addressed with a stylized model in the background. We present a v ariant of the theory relating risk sharing and specialization that has not been studied before although it is a straightforward adaptation of existing models where comparative advantage" is a result only of increasing returns to scale in production.
Consider a risk sharing group" consisting of several regions of equal size. 5 The regions could be states or prefectures within a country, countries within the OECD, and so forth. Consumers in each region are risk averse. There is one consumption good that can be produced with inelastically supplied labor and no xed costs, using any o f s e v eral ex-ante identical technologies, all exhibiting decreasing marginal costs increasing returns to scale and all subject to identically distributed and imperfectly correlated productivity shocks that are speci c to each technology. 6 For simplicity, assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty, in the sense that there are no shocks that are common to all technologies, namely, b y producing with equal use of all the technologies, every region can eliminate GDP variability altogether.
Every region can produce the consumption good with any of the available technologies. The choice of how many technologies to use depends on the trade-o between the desire to take advantage of increasing returns in production on the one hand, and the gains from diversifying the productivity shocks across technologies on the other. We assume that consumers are very risk averse or, alternatively, that the productivity shocks are very violent so that, absent mechanisms for smoothing these shocks, every region will choose to produce with all or most available technologies.
Cross-regional insurance markets constitute a central mechanism for smoothing idiosyncratic regional shocks. When citizens in one region hold debt or equity claims directly or through intermediaries to the output ow of productive assets in other regions, the dividend, interest, and rental income derived from these holdings help smooth the income of all the regions. A second channel for smoothing shocks is borrowing and lending on inter-regional credit markets or, more generally, s a ving and dis-saving in response to shocks. Such behavior amounts to adjustment of the wealth portfolio, including sale and purchase of assets.
The rst mechanism, ex-ante inter-regional insurance, is e ective for smoothing all types of shocks, both permanent and transitory. T o illustrate, if in a given year a severe natural disaster hits the state of Florida, drastically reducing Florida's gross product, the income of Florida's inhabitants will not go down by a s m uch since many of them obtain interest and dividend income from out-of-state sources e.g., investment funds and savings accounts. This is true regardless of the persistence of the shock to Florida's economy.
The second mechanism, ex-post adjustment of asset portfolios, can be used to smooth only transitory shocks. If a negative shock to the income of a region is perceived as temporary, the region's inhabitants will want to borrow or sell assets in order to smooth their consumption. By contrast, a persistent shock to income i.e., a persistent uninsured shock t o GDP will not be smoothed, as we know from permanent income theory. T h us, regions without insurance that are hit by permanent shocks will adjust their permanent consumption level accordingly. W e return to this crucial distinction between ex-ante income smoothing and ex-post consumption smoothing mechanisms shortly. F or now, we concentrate on the rst mechanism, cross-regional insurance that, in our view, is closest in spirit to the above cited theories that motivate our empirical investigation.
Suppose that perfect Pareto e cient cross-regional insurance is available. In this section, we do not distinguish between insurance obtained via markets or via central scal institutions for instance, through taxes and transfers or government aid, but in the empirical implementation we will regard these as separate channels of cross-regional insurance.
For simplicity, assume that there are as many technologies as regions. Then, under full risk sharing, each region will specialize in one technology in order to fully exploit the economies of scale in production. Furthermore, each region will specialize in a di erent technology so that the gains from diversi cation are maximized within the risk sharing group. Given our assumption of no aggregate risk, the total GDP of the risk sharing group and hence, the income and consumption in every region of the group will be non-stochastic.
Suppose that only partial cross-regional insurance is possible and that ex-post smoothing of consumption is not feasible, either because shocks are highly persistent or due to credit market imperfections. It is reasonable to expect a positive association between the degree of cross-regional insurance and the extent of specialization in production where higher specialization means that fewer technologies are used in each region. Obtaining such a result formally requires a speci c model and an explicit de nition of what is meant b y partial insurance. Since our focus is empirical, we c hoose not to engage in such modeling. Our goal in this section is simply to illustrate the relevance of the Razin 1978a, 1978b analysis for the increasing returns case with no comparative advantage due to di erences in technology or endowments.
Some remarks are in order. In the above example, there are as many technologies as regions. If insurance markets are complete, full regional specialization in production is equivalent to full localization or concentration of production|each technology is used in exactly one region. This suggests that the specialization patterns of regions and the regional concentration of production are strongly related. Yet, as the following example illustrates, these are distinct concepts. Suppose that there are more technologies than regions the more realistic case. If risk aversion is su ciently strong, then even if cross-regional insurance is feasible, regions may use more than one technology|otherwise there would be unexploited gains from diversi cation that may exceed forgone bene ts from economies of scale. Thus, although production may be fully concentrated, with every technology being used in exactly one region, specialization in production is not full. In this paper, we focus solely on the issue of regional specialization in production, on which the above cited theoretical studies bear.
An analogous logic holds if the gains from specialization are due to technological comparative advantage, rather than to economies of scale, as in Saint-Paul 1992. It should also be apparent that the one good multi-technology setting is equivalent t o a m ulti-good setting where regions specialize in the production of particular goods rather than in the use of speci c technologies. 7 Since the basic trade-o between diversi cation and specialization has been modeled extensively in the literature, we believe that there is no need to elaborate further on this intuition.
Choosing a risk sharing measure
As explained above, if shocks to the economies of regions and countries are transitory then, even without insurance, consumption can be smoothed ex-post if necessary. Regions can then a ord to specialize regardless of the availability of income insurance. In reality, macroeconomic shocks are highly persistent, and especially international and inter-regional credit markets often exhibit imperfections. Anticipating long-lasting shocks that cannot be smoothed ex-post through saving and dis-saving, regions will not specialize unless they have access to insurance. We, therefore, believe that income-based measures of risk sharing are more appropriate for our study.
In reality, regions and countries smooth shocks through both ex-ante insurance of income and ex-post adjustment o f s a ving. 8 Given the persistent nature of most macroeconomic shocks, ex-post smoothing of consumption cannot be easily explained with standard permanent income theory. This is a manifestation of the well known excess smoothness puzzle" suggested by Campbell and Deaton 1989 . There are many competing explanations of this puzzle, see Deaton 1992 , but none is generally accepted. This further suggests that consumption-based measures of risk sharing are less than ideal for our purpose. 9 For the sake of completeness we report the empirical relation between a consumption-based measure of risk sharing and industrial specialization in Section 5.
Which risk sharing measure correlates better with specialization depends on how decisions to manufacture certain goods and not others, or to build new plants and close down others, are determined. Such decisions are typically made by managers and entrepreneurs, taking into account a m ultitude of factors, for example, the cost of raising capital, the skills and education level of the work force, and incentives provided by local or national governments. In this paper we do not attempt to relate our results to these potential determinants of specialization patterns. They provide, no doubt, natural topics for further research.
Measuring Specialization and Risk Sharing Measuring risk sharing
We measure the extent to which risk is shared within risk sharing groups. Each group consists of regions within a country, or of countries in which case we call each country in the group a region". The representative consumer of each region is a risk averse maximizer of lifetime expected utility from consumption. If utility functions are CRRA, and all regions have a common intertemporal discount factor, a perfect Pareto e cient risk sharing allocation satis es x it = k i X t for all t and all realizations of uncertainty, where x it and X t are generic variables representing regional and aggregate income or consumption. The constant k i is independent of time and state of the world." It re ects the power" including initial wealth of region i in the risk sharing arrangement. If full risk sharing is achieved via income smoothing, then x it and X t represent both income and consumption since, in this case, income equals consumption. If full risk sharing is achieved only after both income and consumption smoothing, in this case, income does not equal consumption, then x it and X t represent consumption.
Earlier empirical work on risk sharing took the perfect risk sharing consumption allocation, c it = k i C t , seriously focusing on tests of full Pareto e cient risk sharing by asking whether idiosyncratic consumption of individuals or countries responds to aggregate uctuations, but not to idiosyncratic shocks to income or GDP. 10 These studies do not, however, fect risk sharing null. Our measures, like most econometric studies of consumption, can not identify news in advance of actual changes in income. 10 Studies using micro-data include Altug and Miller 1990 , Cochrane 1991 , Mace 1991 provide a method for quantifying the amount of risk sharing achieved among a group of individuals, regions, or countries. Nor do they distinguish between income smoothing through insurance and consumption smoothing through ex-post adjustment o f w ealth portfolios. Asdrubali, S rensen, and Yosha 1996 ll this gap, measuring the fraction of idiosyncratic GDP shocks absorbed through various channels of cross-regional or cross-national insurance, and the fraction of shocks that is not smoothed. They distinguish between income insurance through cross-regional holdings of debt and equity capital market income smoothing" and via the super-regional tax-transfer system federal government income smoothing". 11 We describe, rst, their measure of cross-regional insurance via markets, K . This measure captures the degree of inter-regional capital market integration, in the sense of cross-holding of assets. The more diversi ed cross-regional asset holdings are, the less sensitive regional income will be to idiosyncratic region-speci c GDP shocks. This measure of risk sharing corresponds well with the approach taken by Razin 1978a, 1978b who focus on the relationship between trade in nancial assets and specialization in production trade in goods.
Consider the panel regression across the regions of a risk sharing group log PINC it = 1 measures the fraction of idiosyncratic GDP shocks that is not eliminated through crossregional insurance. More precisely, they show that in the regression log GDP it , log PINC it = t + K log GDP it + it ; 1 the coe cient K measures the fraction of idiosyncratic shocks to GDP that is absorbed through cross-regional ownership of assets. K equals 1 , 1 . Thus, our measure of risk sharing through inter-regional capital markets is K . The intuition is that if there is no insurance, log GDP it and log PINC it comove perfectly and the left hand side of 1 does not comove with the regressor, log GDP it , making K = 0. If there is perfect insurance, log PINC it is una ected by region-speci c uctuations in log GDP it , and 1 boils down to a regression of log GDP it on itself, implying that K = 1 .
The following quali cations should be kept in mind: Since our measure of capital market smoothing, K , is based on personal income, it does not fully separate market-based income insurance through cross-border factor income from income smoothing through patterns of capital stock depreciation and, especially, adjustment of corporate saving. Typically, rms smooth dividend payments in response to economic performance. Using country level National Accounts data, S rensen and Yosha 1998 show that corporate saving smoothes a signi cant portion of GDP shocks at the annual frequency, but not at the 3-year frequency. 13 Our regional data sets do not allow us to quantify the extent to which K re ects cross-regional factor income ows versus adjustment of corporate saving rates. Further, our estimate of K does not fully separate income smoothing via markets from income insurance provided by super-regional scal institutions. For example, in the United States, personal income includes social security transfers to individuals by the federal government. To correct for this, Asdrubali, S rensen, and Yosha 1996 construct the variable state income" that represents the income of a U.S. state prior to any federal tax or transfer. It is not possible to construct a similar variable for all the regions and countries which w e study in the present article.
K is therefore an approximation to the measure of capital market smoothing in Asdrubali, S rensen, and Yosha 1996. 14 We turn to the measure of cross-regional insurance via super-regional taxes and transfers. Most tax-transfer systems were not designed to provide insurance although there are exceptions, like unemployment or disability insurance funds, but progressivity of the tax code implies that taxes and transfers help smooth income. The following panel regression is designed to capture the amount of income smoothing provided by cross-regional taxes and transfers, log PINC it , log PDINC it = t + T log GDP it + it ; 2 where PDINC represents personal disposable income. The coe cient T is positive if personal disposable income covaries less with GDP than personal income, i.e., if the federal government" of the risk sharing group provides income insurance. It can be interpreted as the fraction of the cross-sectional variance averaged over time absorbed by the federal" scal system of the risk sharing group; see Asdrubali, S rensen, and Yosha 1996 for details. 15 If overall income uncertainty is important, then it may b e w arranted to measure risk sharing as the combined fractions of idiosyncratic GDP shocks absorbed through cross-regional ownership of assets and via the super-regional tax-transfer system. Thus, we construct the measure K+T obtained from the panel data regression log GDP it , log PDINC it = t + K+T log GDP it + it ; 3 where K+T measures the total amount of income insurance, and conceptually, K+T = K + T . Equation 3 is similar to equation 1, with personal disposable income substituted for personal income, and an analogous interpretation of the coe cient. For brevity w e only display estimates of K+T and not T .
In our empirical analysis, in this paper, we focus mainly on K , income insurance via markets, and to some extent o n K + T , income insurance via markets and the scal system. We can compute, in an analogous manner, C , consumption smoothing via saving and dissaving, and K + T + C , total income and consumption smoothing. In Section 5, we provide further details, but for the moment w e focus on income insurance. and the United Kingdom in Alberola and Asdrubali 1998 and Dedola, Usai, and Vannini 1998, respectively , are also calculated using simple personal income measures rather than the equivalent of state income." 15 In principle, one could regress log PDINCit on log PINCit, and regard one minus the coe cient a s a measure of risk sharing through the super-regional scal system. Such a measure might be more natural if one were to study smoothing of personal income, per se. In the present study, i t i s c o n venient to de ne all income and consumption smoothing relative to GDP shocks.
It is worth noting that if a particular region in a risk sharing group, say a U.S. state, shares risk with regions in another group, say a region of the U.K., our risk sharing measures for both the U.S. and the U.K. will attribute this income smoothing to risk sharing within the U.S. and the U.K. Since measured risk sharing among countries is very small see S rensen, and Yosha 1998, our measures of risk sharing can be safely regarded as genuinely measuring intra-group risk sharing.
Measuring specialization
We calculate specialization indices for the 2-digit International Standard Industrial Classication ISIC of manufacturing sectors. We do not use 1-digit sectors since the amount of specialization in, e.g., agriculture or mining, is determined mainly by endowments of fertile soil and extractable minerals. We performed exploratory work at the 1-digit level, but obtained rather mixed results. We w ere not able to collect consistent data at the 3-digit level for many regions and we suspect that risk sharing considerations may be less central in determining patterns of specialization at the 3-digit level since many shocks may be common to several 3-digit industries; for instance, oil-shocks a ecting most chemical industries. Each index is computed for each region for the relevant sample years and averaged over time. 16 The indices are calculated as follows. Let GDP s i denote the GDP of sector s in region i, and GDP M i the total manufacturing GDP of this region. We measure the specialization of a region by the distance between the vector of sector shares in region i's manufacturing GDP, GDP s i = GDP M i , and the vector of average sector shares across the regions other than i in the risk sharing group,
where S is the number of sectors and J is the number of regions in the group.
We nd this variance-like measure natural given our focus on the e ect of risk sharing on specialization. Notice that SPEC i 1 , the square deviations index," measures the extent t o which region i di ers, in terms of the composition of manufacturing, from the other regions in i's risk sharing group, not from all the regions in the sample. Thus, the di erence in the industrial composition of, for instance, Japan relative to other countries in the sample, does 16 The alternative computation where we rst average production over time and then calculate the index yields very similar results.
13 not a ect the specialization indices of individual Japanese prefectures. The di erence in the industrial composition of, say, Japan and Canada does, however, a ect the specialization indices of Japan and Canada when they are treated as regions within the OECD risk sharing group.
We also study the absolute deviations index,"
which is a direct generalization of the index suggested by Krugman 1991 for pairs of countries. This measure attributes less weight to extreme values and is important for the purpose of verifying that the empirical results are robust to minor changes in speci cation. 17 Instrumental variables
To deal with potential endogeneity of cross-regional holding of assets, we use instruments which facilitate risk sharing but are unlikely to be subject to reverse causality, such as shareholder rights in particular, protection of minority shareholders from abuse by management or majority shareholders. The rationale for using such instruments is spelled out forcefully in La Porta et al. 1997 Porta et al. , 1998 . When the legal system provides protection for investors, they will be more inclined to buy securities issued by rms, directly or via intermediaries, to purchase real estate for investment purposes, or to keep large sums of money in long-term savings and insurance plans. Similarly, nancial intermediaries will be more willing to lend and invest beyond the close circle of client rms. This is particularly true for cross-regional transactions that are truly at arm's length." Thus, better investor protection via the nation-wide legal system entails more inter-regional income insurance via nancial markets. La Porta et al. 1998 argue that shareholder rights vary systematically across countries, and consider four main legal traditions: Common Law, French-, German-, and Scandinavian tradition, with the most extensive shareholder rights in Common Law countries. The details need not concern us here|the point w e w ant t o m a k e is that important determinants of nancial de-velopment, for instance the amount of shareholder protection, is determined by long-standing rules determined by political history. The upshot is that the legal tradition indicators are truly exogenous for risk sharing over our relatively short sample period of about 20 years. A highly capitalized and hence liquid stock market, and a developed nancial sector contribute to nation-wide income smoothing. These variables are likely to be determined also by other factors besides legal investor protection e.g., the educational and technological level in the country. We, therefore, also use the size of the nancial sector relative t o GDP as a separate instrument in order to gauge the sensitivity of our results to alternative reasonable instrumental variables. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for our sample of regions and risk sharing groups. The number of regions varies considerably across groups. The United States and Japan consist of about 50 regions each, while in other risk sharing groups there are as few as 4 or 5 regions. There are substantial di erences in the per capita GDP of the risk sharing groups. Latin American per capita GDP is very low, at $2237, and the per capita GDP of Spain is less than half that of the wealthiest groups. Table 1 also shows that, on average, countries have a larger population than regions within countries, and that regions vary signi cantly in population. Larger regions are likely to be less specialized due to greater heterogeneity of the population or of geo-physical characteristics such as climate, landscape, and natural resources. Furthermore, in larger regions, scale economies in production may be exhausted for many industries. Finally, the table reveals that population density v aries across regions, in particular within Japan. Population density m a y a ect localization. Krugman 1991 argues that transportation costs determine where manufacturing industries locate, with high transportation cost industries locating in densely populated areas. Such patterns of localization may also cause industrial specialization to vary with population density.
Empirical Analysis
To give an impression of the characteristics of highly specialized regions, we display i n Table 2 some facts regarding the 15 most specialized regions. For comparison, Table 3 displays the same information for the 15 least specialized regions. The most specialized regions are regions within countries, whereas 4 of the least specialized regions are countries. The share of manufacturing in regional gross product varies considerably across the highly specialized regions from 4 percent i n H a waii and Wyoming to 35 percent i n P ais Vasco. The least specialized regions show less variation in the share of manufacturing. On average, the more specialized regions have a smaller population, although some of the most specialized regions are larger than small OECD countries. Less specialized regions exhibit a somewhat higher population density than the most specialized regions although Okinawa and Kanagawa i n Japan are obvious exceptions. Based on these observations, our regressions control for size and population, and weight the regional data by manufacturing GDP.
In Figure 1 , we display the distribution of the specialization indices across regions. The distribution of the squared deviations index, SPEC 1 , is clearly right-skewed while log SPEC 1 is almost bell shaped." We, therefore, use the latter in the regressions in order to minimize the risk that our results are driven by outliers. The absolute deviations index, SPEC 2 , i s m uch less skewed so we use this index without transformation in our regressions. Table 4 displays income-based measures of risk sharing by risk sharing groups. We restrict attention, for the moment, to the rst two columns, K and K+T . According to both measures, Italy exhibits the highest amount of risk sharing between regions. The United States and Canada show a high a level of risk sharing through capital markets K i n comparison to the United Kingdom, Japan, and Spain. 18 The ranking of the regions is the same according to both measures. The interpretation of K+T for groups of countries is somewhat di erent since T is calculated on the basis of international net transfers while for regions it uses cross-regional taxes and transfers to and from the central government of the country. Nevertheless, a clear result in Table 4 is that groups of countries, not surprisingly, exhibit the least amount of risk sharing for both income-based risk sharing measures. Table 5 displays the average specialization indices of regions within each risk sharing group and a regression of the specialization index the underlying year-by-year estimates on a time trend.
The sample periods were chosen with two considerations in mind. First, we w ould like the samples used for calculating specialization to overlap with those used for calculating 18 As mentioned in the previous section, our measures here do not isolate the e ect of federal insurance to the same extent as the regressions in Asdrubali, S rensen, and Yosha 1996, which w ere based on extensive calculations and imputations of the impact on income of the federal tax-transfer system calculations that our data set does not allow us to replicate for many of the risk sharing groups. If we compare, for the United States in the 1980s one of the periods for which Asdrubali, S rensen, and Yosha 1996 provide results, the measure K that we use here which is based on personal income to the measure in their paper, we nd that K, as reported here, over-estimates income smoothing via markets by about 5 percent. Our main results are not likely to be a ected by this discrepancy, although the results involving K must be interpreted more broadly as also re ecting some risk sharing provided through the scal system of super-regional governments. risk sharing. Second, we w ould like a long sample for calculating risk sharing, because we later use the risk sharing index as a regressor. The longer the sample period, the smaller the standard errors of the risk sharing estimates and, consequently, the lower the errors-invariables bias. For countries with many regions and a reasonably long sample available for calculating both specialization and risk sharing, we c hose the longest overlapping sample, as for the United States and the United Kingdom. For the OECD, for example, where we h a ve a relatively small sample of countries, we c hose a somewhat longer sample for calculating the index of risk sharing in order to minimize measurement error than that used for calculating the specialization indices, where we used the longest sample of 2-digit manufacturing GDP data available. Similarly, for Canada, where specialization can only be calculated for a rather short span of years, we calculated the risk sharing measure using a longer sample than that used for the specialization indices. We experimented with the sample lengths and fortunately, the results are not very sensitive to the exact sample periods chosen.
It is clear from Table 5 that regions within countries are much more specialized than countries within groups of countries such as the EC or Latin America. Regions of Spain are the most specialized and EC countries are the least specialized. These results hold for both specialization indices, although SPEC 1 clearly varies more than SPEC 2 .
The regressions on a time trend reveal that specialization has been decreasing over time, albeit slowly. The coe cient is negative for both specialization indices, although it is not signi cant at the 5 percent level. It is borderline signi cant for the squared deviations index, SPEC 1 . We i n terpret this as re ecting a relation between specialization and economic development, but a study of this issue will divert us from the topic of the present paper. The result is consistent with Kim 1995 who nds that the specialization of U.S. states has declined markedly since the 1930s, a phenomenon that is consistent with a negative relation between income or wealth and specialization. The mechanism may be one, as described in Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997, where a minimum scale in some technologies makes these unavailable to less developed countries. The time-series patterns in specialization are not likely to be important for the present study, where regressions of specialization indices on risk sharing measures are cross-sectional; but they underscore the potential importance of correcting for di erent levels of development, when risk sharing groups with disparate levels of per capita income are included. Figure 2 displays a scatter plot of specialization measured by the SPEC 1 index versus the market-based risk sharing index, K . Each point in the graph represents a region and the horizontal axis measures the amount of risk sharing, i.e., the amount of risk sharing in the group to which the region belongs. Since this number is identical for each region in a group, the data will form dots along a vertical line for each risk sharing group. The vertical axis measures the degree of specialization of the region. The positive relation between risk sharing and specialization in manufacturing is highlighted by the univariate regression line displayed.
Potentially, the positive slope tted in Figure 2 may be spurious in the sense that it re ects left-out regressors such as population or population density. W e, therefore, performed regressions of SPEC 1 on K , controlling for the population size and density o f e a c h region, for the share of manufacturing in regional GDP, and for the average per capita GDP in each risk sharing group. In Figure 3 , we show the relation between the specialization index, SPEC 1 , and the risk sharing measure, K , when the other regressors are controlled for. 19 The positive slope is still clearly visible. This is, however, only for illustration as our regression results below are based on a log-transformation of the specialization index. Table 6 displays regressions, for various samples of risk sharing groups, of log SPEC 1 on regional characteristics population and population density, on the average per capita GDP of the risk sharing group, on this variable squared, and on the risk sharing measure K . The regressions are all weighted by the logarithm of real manufacturing GDP in each region. We also experimented with a dummy v ariable for regions for which the risk sharing group is part of a custom union all groups except Latin America and non-EC OECD countries. This variable was not signi cant and is left out in the regressions we report. 20 Sample A is our preferred sample," leaving out Latin American countries for which the risk sharing measure is most likely to be imprecise relying on extrapolations|see Appendix| as well as bad data in the rst place. Sample B leaves out risk sharing groups composed of countries. It is important to examine whether our results are entirely driven by the dichotomies cross-country versus cross-regional risk sharing" or cross-country versus crossregional capital and labor mobility," or by systematic di erences in international and intrana- 19 We regressed both the specialization index and the risk sharing measure on the other regressors and took the residuals. These residuals are plotted in Figure 3 . By the Frisch-Waugh theorem, the slope of the displayed regression line corresponds to the coe cient K that would be obtained in a multiple regression of the specialization index on the same regressors. 20 We do not interpret this as implying that barriers to trade are not important for specialization in production, since our sample contains only two risk sharing groups for which trade barriers are likely to be important and, furthermore, the Latin American data are not very reliable. tional trade patterns. For example, as previously mentioned, trade barriers may be important even if our sample is not able to document this. The results for sample B cannot, however, be driven by trade barriers or any other border e ects since all the risk sharing groups in this sample are countries with fully integrated regions. Sample C leaves out Latin America, and Italy that exhibits a particularly large K . Sample D leaves out the United States and Latin America to see if the results are mainly driven by the 50 U.S. states. Sample E consists of all the regions including the Latin America group. Sample F leaves out Japan and Latin America for comparison to regressions using other risk sharing measures, which our data set does not allow us to calculate for Japan.
The results in Table 6 are qualitatively the same across the various samples, although there is variation in the magnitude and signi cance levels of some coe cients. In all samples, we nd a negative sign on the per capita GDP of the risk sharing groups GDP G and a positive sign on this variable squared, both highly signi cant. 21 For Sample E, which includes Latin America, the estimated coe cients of GDP G and GDP G squared are somewhat di erent compared to the other samples. This most likely indicates that patterns of specialization are somewhat di erent a t l o wer levels of development, which i s y et another reason besides data issues for leaving out Latin America in the other samples. Population density exhibits a clearly signi cant positive coe cient. It seems that the impact of population density on specialization is particularly strong in Japan, since the coe cient becomes insigni cant when the Japanese prefectures are left out see the last column in the table. This is not a focus of our paper, so we abstain from attempting to interpret this nding in more detail. Population show s a t ypically signi cant negative coe cient which is to be expected due to greater heterogeneity of large regions and large populations. Alternatively, this may re ect dis-economies of scale beyond a certain minimal level of output that is more likely reached in larger regions. Clearly, large regions like California and Texas, not to speak of Germany and Japan in the samples including countries as regions," cannot fully specialize in a narrow industry. The share of manufacturing in GDP exhibits a positive coe cient, but is borderline signi cant.
We n o w turn to the coe cient of main interest: In sample A, the risk sharing measure, K , takes a coe cient of 1.21, strongly signi cant with a t-value of 3.69. 22 This is our main result: Risk sharing matters for specialization. In the following we demonstrate that it is a robust nding. If we leave out risk sharing groups composed of countries sample B we have only six risk sharing groups, but the coe cient of the risk sharing measure is still clearly signi cant and the point estimate is 1.45. The results for sample B, with no risk sharing groups composed of countries, cannot possibly be a consequence of trade barriers. Clearly, capital market integration plays a major role in determining patterns of industrial specialization.
The estimated coe cients of K are similar for samples D and E without Italy and the United States, respectively. Including Latin America as a risk sharing group sample E again has little e ect on the estimated coe cient, compared to sample A. Finally, the results for sample F dropping Japan also resemble those for sample A, except that the coe cient of K is only borderline signi cant.
Our measure of risk sharing is an estimate and therefore subject to measurement error. 23 Measurement error in a regressor is likely to lead to a biased estimate; it is, however, easy to demonstrate that the coe cient to a regressor measured with error when there is only one coe cient with measurement error is biased towards zero. Therefore, if we nd a signi cant coe cient to the risk sharing measure as we do we can be con dent that the coe cient, in the absence of measurement error, would be even larger. The robustness and similarity o f the results across the various samples further strengthens our conviction that they are not seriously a ected by measurement error. Overall, the clear impression from Table 6 is that more risk sharing is associated with greater specialization. Table 7 examines robustness to speci cation, including choice of specialization index, while still relying on the risk sharing measure K . In some columns, the risk sharing measure is interacted with the share of manufacturing in each region's GDP: If manufacturing is only a tiny fraction of a particular region's GDP, then the production risk of the manufacturing sector can easily be diversi ed within the region. In such a case, the amount of cross-regional risk sharing may be of little importance for specialization patterns in manufacturing. The speci cation in Table 6 seemed more straight-forward to us, but the choice of functional form is not based on an explicit theoretical model and is, therefore, somewhat arbitrary. Fortunately, the results for the alternative speci cation are very similar to those reported in Table 6 in terms of statistical signi cance. In the third column of Table 7 we show results similar to those in the rst column of Table 6 , except that the data for each region are weighted by the logarithm of population. The results are very similar to the results found using manufacturing GDP weights. We further show regressions of the SPEC 2 specialization index on the same regressors. The results are overall similar.
To further examine robustness, we split the samples used for calculating risk sharing and specialization roughly midway, obtaining an early" and a late" sample since for Canada, specialization can only be calculated from 1987 on, we left it out in this exercise. Estimating risk sharing for the early and the late sample gave v ery similar results, except for a strong increase in K for Spain, consistent with results in Alberola and Asdrubali 1998. We further found a small decrease in specialization for all risk sharing groups apart from the European Community, consistent with Kim's 1995 study of specialization in the United States. The point estimates in regressions for the early and late sub-periods, for both sample A and sample B, are similar to those reported in Table 6 and are signi cant for both samples. We do not report the detailed coe cients. 24 We further estimated the model using risk sharing measures calculated with non-overlapping 3-year observations 3-year di erencing of the data. S rensen and Yosha 1998 found, using OECD country level data, that smoothing through corporate saving declines to near zero when moving from 1-to 3-year sampling. If failure to separate out the e ect of adjustment in corporate saving rates a ects the estimation of K , then we w ould expect to nd quite di erent results using estimates of K based on 1-and 3-year intervals. The results not reported, however, are very close to those reported in Table 6 .
The consistency of the empirical results across the various samples and speci cations demonstrates that, empirically, there is a robust positive relation between risk sharing and specialization, a relation which is at the heart of much theoretical work, but never documented in the data.
Direction of causality: Instrumental variables estimation
The potential for the extent o f i n ter-regional risk sharing being determined by the amount o f regional specialization calls for a careful interpretation of the above regressions. Fortunately, we h a ve v ery good in the sense of being exogenously determined instrumental variables, as explained in the previous section. We use three di erent instruments: 1 protection of shareholder rights indices; 2 a cumulative protection of creditor rights index; and 3 the average GDP share of nancial services, insurance, and real estate FIRE. For shareholder rights, we u s e 4 v ariables from La Porta et al. 1998, Table 4 . We select the instruments with the highest correlation with our risk sharing measure. Using all instruments is not feasible since we h a ve few risk sharing groups in our sample, and searching for the best" set of instruments may i n validate the t-statistics pre-testing bias. We also use the overall index of creditor protection rights from La Porta et al. 1998, Table 2 , column 5. In our sample, creditor protection rights are negatively correlated with shareholder protection rights and with our risk sharing measure; so our interpretation is that creditor rights play the role of an alternative inverse measure of shareholder rights. Finally, w e use the share of the nancial sector in GDP obtained from OECD National Accounts. Since this instrument i s from a di erent source than the creditor and shareholder protection indices, it serves as a further robustness check for the instrumental variables estimation.
The empirical results, displayed in Table 8 , are very close to those reported in Table 6 , and display t-statistics for the coe cient o f K that are clearly signi cant at the 5 percent level except for the second column in Table 8 . The point estimates are always positive and in the same range as the estimates in Table 6 . 25 The instrumental variables regressions provide strong evidence of a causal link running from risk sharing income insurance to specialization in production. We t h us believe t o h a ve provided solid empirical evidence for an important mechanism through which a developed and reliable nancial system, backed by a legal environment that protects investor rights, enhances specialization and|in light of the theoretical and empirical studies surveyed in the Introduction|promotes growth. 26 25 Formal Hausman-type tests for the regressions in Table 6 are never close to rejecting the null of exogeneity of K. These tests may h a ve l o w p o wer, so we attach more weight to the fact that the point estimates for the instrumental variables regressions take sensible values. 26 The instrumental variables regressions are also consistent in the presence of measurement error in the risk sharing measure, so these results constitute yet more evidence that measurement error in this regressor dose
Further tests
In Table 9 , we display regressions using the measure of risk sharing based on disposable income, K+T , that captures the cumulative insurance role of capital markets and the scal system. These regressions use sample F, as we do not have disposable income data for Japan. If the risk sharing provided by federal tax-transfer systems is important for specialization decisions, this measure should also be positively correlated with industrial specialization. The point estimates of the coe cients of K+T are positive but not statistically signi cant. In light of the weak signi cance of the coe cient o f K in the last column of Table 6 sample F, we cannot with con dence attribute the lack of statistical signi cance to the use of K+T rather than to the particular sample used, without the 47 Japanese prefectures. In order to determine with greater certainty which of the income-based risk sharing measures is best correlated with specialization, a much larger sample is needed; but the evidence in Table 9,  compared to Table 6 , raises the conjecture that capital market integration is more important for specialization than federal income insurance. It is nevertheless reassuring that the signs of the coe cients are not sensitive to the way the income-based risk sharing measure is de ned.
We experimented with instrumental variables estimation for the risk sharing measure K+T . F or the legal system" instruments, we do not get signi cant estimates, which is not surprising since the legal system is unlikely to be a determinant o f g o vernment tax policy. When the share of FIRE in GDP is used as an instrument for K+T , w e nd results similar to those in Table 8 .
Consumption Based Measures of Risk Sharing
In Section 2, we argued that regions will not specialize unless they have access to income insurance and, hence, consumption-based measures of risk sharing may be less than ideal for our purpose. We suggested that an income-based measure of risk sharing is most appropriate for our study. Nevertheless, since the proposition that risk sharing enhances specialization in production has been ubiquitously formulated within models where economic agents ultimately derive utility from consumption, w e believe that an empirical investigation of the relation between a consumption-based measure of risk sharing and specialization is warranted.
To carry out such an analysis, we need a measure of the fraction of GDP shocks smoothed not seriously a ect our results.
23 via saving and dis-saving. This measure is derived in the same fashion as the measure of smoothing through taxes and transfers. We regress the growth rate of personal disposable income minus the growth rate of consumption on the growth rate of GDP, controlling for aggregate GDP shocks by including time xed e ects:
log PDINC it , log CONS it = t + C log GDP it + it :
4
The measure C is positive if consumption covaries less with GDP than personal disposable income, measuring the fraction of region-speci c shocks to GDP absorbed through adjustments in the saving rate. If regions consider income smoothing through capital markets or the scal system and consumption smoothing via saving behavior as close substitutes, then the risk sharing measure that is relevant for specialization decisions is the overall fraction of GDP shocks smoothed:
We estimate K+T+C directly from the panel regression log GDP it , log CONS it = t + K+T+C log GDP it + it . This allows us to obtain an estimate of K+T+C also for Japan for which no measure of disposable personal income, consistent with our data, is available. Due to the estimation procedure, the measure of overall smoothing is only approximately equal to the sum of the partial" measures of smoothing.
The estimated values of K+T+C for the various risk sharing groups are displayed in the third column of Table 4 . 27 According to this measure, consumption is fully bu ered against GDP shocks in Italy, but not elsewhere.
In Table 11 , we display the relation between the consumption-based risk sharing measure, K+T+C , and specialization. The performance of this measure is clearly not good, with the sign of the coe cient t o K+T+C alternating between positive and negative, and the coe cient clearly insigni cant. This is fully consistent with our analysis in Section 2: Specialization in production is mainly a ected by the degree of capital market integration, and maybe by other income insurance mechanisms, but not by the amount of consumption smoothing through saving and dis-saving.
Another interpretation is simply that the determinants of consumption, and in particular consumption smoothing, are not well understood, and that measures of consumption need to be improved. Hence, we h a ve many consumption puzzles" see the survey by Deaton 1992, and Table 11 displays yet another. In any e v ent, an important implication is that the exclusive focus of the empirical risk sharing literature on overall consumption smoothing, rather than on income smoothing|the rst level of total consumption smoothing|may h a ve been unwarranted.
Concluding Remarks
We provided evidence that risk sharing and industrial specialization are positively correlated using a large data set that combines international and intranational inter-regional observations. We demonstrated that this correlation is robust, surviving when variables whose omission can potentially generate a spurious correlation are controlled for. In particular, our evidence indicates that specialization patterns are not driven by higher barriers to international versus inter-regional trade or by higher factor mobility within versus across countries. We further demonstrated that the positive signi cant correlation between risk sharing and specialization is robust to most changes in the sample of regions and risk sharing groups. As instruments for the amount o f i n ter-regional risk sharing we utilized quantitative measures of features of the legal system for instance shareholder rights, which are likely to be exogenous to specialization in production but which facilitate risk sharing. We found strong evidence that the correlation between risk sharing and specialization indeed re ects a causal relation from risk sharing to specialization. In the debate on European Monetary Uni cation, it has been argued|Frankel and Rose 1998|that countries may experience more correlated shocks to GDP after entering a common currency area, due to the fact that a higher trade volume seems to be associated with more correlated GDP shocks. Our analysis adds a quali er to this observation: If formation of a common currency area leads to more capital market integration and therefore also to more inter-country risk sharing, then countries will specialize more, which i s l i k ely to lead to less correlated GDP shocks. Which e ect is more important can only be determined from further empirical work. 28 29 To get a sense of how serious this omission might be, we exploited the availability of these data for U.S. states, and calculated indices of specialization with and without the wood sector for all U.S. states. The results were not sensitive to the omission of the wood sector, so we believe that the non availability o f w ood sector data for the OECD countries is a minor issue.
30 del Negro 1998 constructs price indices for individual states, but nds that risk sharing regressions are not substantially a ected by using state speci c price indices rather than the U.S.-wide price index.
3. EC: Subset of OECD data. For the manufacturing levels, data are available for 6 countries Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Netherlands, West Germany for the period 1977 93. Greece is omitted since it is an outlier in the group in terms of income per capita. For Denmark 1971 80 and for the Netherlands 1971 76, corporate saving data are not available making it impossible to construct risk sharing measures that are comparable with the personal income-based measures that we use for regions within countries see footnote 13. Thus, for Denmark and the Netherlands, these years are not used in the measurement of risk sharing, whereas for other countries the entire sample period 1971 93 is used.
non-EC OECD:
We use data for Austria, Canada, Finland, and the United States.
We are restricted to this limited sample since corporate saving data are not available for several countries see the previous item. 5. Canada: Data for Canadian provinces are available from the CANSIM database maintained by Statistics Canada. We use manufacturing GDP at factor cost at current prices for each industry by province for the period 1987 93. The 3-digit data 21 sectors are aggregated to the same 2-digit sectors as the United States BEA data. At the 3-digit level our data sources are not compatible. The data are available for 5 provinces Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec for 1987 93. Personal income, personal disposable income, consumption, population, and regional CPI are also available from CANSIM. The risk sharing measure is computed for the period 1979 95 for the same 5 provinces above. Data are transformed to real terms using each province's own yearly consumer price indices. Exchange rate data are obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics database. Land area is also from CANSIM. Notes: GDP G : Gross domestic product per capita of risk sharing group G. Manufacturing GDP Share" is the average over the sample of the share of manufacturing GDP in total GDP of each region. All variables in all regressions are weighted by log of manufacturing GDP. Sample F is used for all regressions: Full sample minus Latin America and Japan. t-values in parentheses. 
